FISCO BCOS consortium chain: transcripts and key records are attested on-chain, verifiable and tamper-proof.
Each has its own cost; here is which side we chose and why.
There is no optimal solution, only solutions that fit the scenario.
| Solution | Trustworthiness | Cost | Use cases |
|---|---|---|---|
| Database + audit log | Depends on trust in the central party | Low | Internal traceability within a single entity |
| Consortium Chain (from 3 nodes) | Co-attested by multiple parties | Medium (needs 3 machines + operations) | Multi-party collaboration with tamper resistance |
| Public chain | Fully open | High (gas costs + poor performance) | Scenarios that need open, external verification |
Client names are anonymized per confidentiality requirements.
The order cannot be reversed: starting with write operations or multi-step orchestration makes errors very hard to trace.
Ask first: how many independent parties are involved? If there is only one, do not put it on a chain.
3 nodes with PBFT is the minimum viable configuration and tolerates 1 node failure. Add more according to the number of participants.
Decide which fields go on chain, which stay local and how the hash is computed. Once fixed, this is hard to change.
Map business operations to on-chain transactions through the SDK, and build in asynchronous handling and retry on failure: chain writes are slower than database writes.
Give end users a page they can check: enter an ID and get the on-chain record plus the hash comparison. A chain without a verification entry point is as good as none.
No adjectives; write the specifications.
These are questions we have actually been asked, answered without marketing spin.